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By: Rejoice Taddy
It is a busy morning, with the hum of motorbikes filling the air, but the rhythm of daily life suddenly changes by midday. Soldiers fill the streets, take over the national broadcaster, and announce that the democratic government has been dissolved. By nightfall, silence takes over—the coup that was once a rumour has become a reality.
This scene, while not identical, was repeated across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2022 and 2023, shaking the Sahelian States and changing their sociopolitical status.
“These coups overturned fragile democracies, created instability, and increased geopolitical tensions,” says Silas Jonathan, an OSINT expert and the Digital Investigations Manager at the Centre for Journalism Innovation and Development (CJID).
He adds that in recent years, the Sahel has taken a different direction. External forces, through both covert and open means, perpetuated both online (social media) and offline, have pushed these countries to return to the very systems they once rejected, under the belief that “strong leadership” is the answer.
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“This is now spilling to neighbouring countries like Nigeria through dogged online propaganda. Citizens are romanced by the idea of military regimes,” Jonathan warns.
A clear example was Nigeria’s #EndBadGovernance protests in August 2024, where people in different states waved Russian flags, called for military intervention, and supported the idea of a military government. Many, including minors, were persuaded by small payments or misleading online campaigns, believing they were supporting a good cause.
This pattern mirrors what happened in the Sahel, where foreign influence helped create the current situation. Now, similar ideas are reaching Nigeria through targeted disinformation and covert propaganda on social media, convincing some citizens that this could be their solution.
A swift pattern to dissuade and disinform
A typical instance of this narrative begins with an X (formerly Twitter) account based in Mali (as indicated in the account bio) named @Sissoko Sora Demba, which frequently shares perspectives on Nigeria, many of which are false or misleading. Despite originating from a French-speaking region, the account’s focus on Nigerian affairs raises suspicions, particularly due to its unusual characteristics. Created in January 2023, the account has gained 26,100 followers while following 7,849 accounts and posting an exceptionally high volume of content—over 100,000 posts to date.
The account contains no identifiable personal information about the user. A French-to-English translation expert finds that the contents of the account are dedicated political commentary, often emphasising topics related to the Sahel and Nigeria’s relationships with Western and Eastern powers.
This account’s activity would be less concerning if it merely discussed Nigeria without the consistent dissemination of false narratives and manipulated sentiments. One such example is a claim shared on June 3, 2024, featuring an image of armed individuals in military fatigues with vehicles in the background.
The post alleged that 20 military personnel and 71 civilians were killed, with 190 others kidnapped in a Boko Haram attack on an Aba checkpoint in Abia State. At the time, the post garnered significant engagement, including 13,900 views, 23 comments, 35 shares, 218 likes, and four bookmarks.
DUBAWA’s investigation of the claim revealed that it was false. The alleged incident did not occur in Abia State, and the accompanying image was misleading. The photo was traced back to a 2013 event involving Boko Haram’s former leader, Abubakar Shekau, who made a video pledging allegiance to ISIS.
Engagement with the post, primarily from French-speaking users, showed that many believed in the narrative. Comments reflected sentiments that Nigeria’s insecurity warranted external intervention, including a preference for military-led governance as a solution.
Another viral post involved a manipulated video of Nigerian billionaire Aliko Dangote speaking French. Analysis using Deepware.ai confirmed it was a deepfake, evident from the unnatural speech patterns. By Nov. 26, 2024, the video had gained significant traction, with over 80,000 views, 224 shares, 595 likes, and 137 bookmarks, contributing further to the spread of disinformation.
The account repeatedly criticises Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s leadership, describing him as ineffective and associating him with drug trafficking. It frequently advocates for military governance in Nigeria while promoting Russia as an ideal model of governance. Russia is often portrayed as a nation of non-interference and security, contrasted sharply with Western countries like the U.S., Britain, and France, which the account often disparages as meddlesome colonial powers.
Infographics by Rejoice Taddy.
The X account frequently references events to reinforce its narrative of Western interference in Nigeria. For instance, it highlighted the arrest warrant issued for Andrew Wynne, a British national accused of attempting to destabilise Nigeria under the pretence of operating a bookshop. This incident was framed as evidence of ongoing Western meddling in Nigeria’s affairs. Similarly, the account linked President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s visit to the French President to claims of foreign interference, suggesting these engagements served neo-colonial interests.
In contrast, the account consistently praised Russia as a governance model for Africa, presenting it as free from neo-colonial influence and committed to supporting African autonomy. This portrayal aligns with the account’s broader pro-Russian, anti-Western narrative strategy.
“Everyone has the right to share what they believe in online, whether their ideological leanings or support for a cause. However, when disinformation is utilised for this cause, then it’s an infringement on people’s right to quality information,” Mr Jonathan says.
When the #EndBadGovernance protest began, the account’s activity spiked as it doled out images and videos related to the protest with keen interest. It consistently displayed Nigerians being dissatisfied with the current government system and advocated for Russian intervention, hinting that Russia was a preferable model for African governance. Despite not taking a direct stance on the protest itself, the account focused heavily on content from the protest that featured people waving flags, furthering its narrative of discontent with Nigeria’s leadership system. In some instances, it shared unrelated pictures and videos linking them to the protest.
Analysis of contents and narratives shared before, during and after the #EndBadGovernance protest, in 2024.
Another interesting data gathered from Tweetbinder was the percentage of Russian content this X account has been spreading. It summed up to 83% of most of its contents which was either a stand-alone or was combined with discussions of the affairs of other countries like Nigeria.
Linked accounts
While the main X account spreads disinformation, a network of accounts from the Sahel region interact with @Sissoko Sora Demba’s posts and share similar false narratives. These accounts also promote pro-Russian views. Among them, two accounts are closely linked to Nigeria, contributing to the spread of these narratives and supporting the pro-military regime in Africa.
Two of the accounts from the list were found to share posts in English: @Africanman and @ColonelAfzal. They also identified themselves as pro-Russsian and pro-AES
@ColnelAzfal is a Nigerian who refers to himself as an anti-Imperialist, a pan-Africanist who is pro-AES and believes that Russia does nothing but good, and does not hesitate to tweet about his support, thoughts and interest for Russia – a country he believes Nigeria should emulate.
@Africanman, who identifies as Ugandan, shares controversial opinions about Nigeria and promotes narratives that align with pro-Russian and anti-Western viewpoints.
A Screenshot of an African man’s X account.
Expert views on online campaigns targeted at Nigeria’s democracy
Mark Duerksen, the Strategic Communications Manager and Research Associate at the African Centre for Strategic Studies highlighted an increasing trend where local actors, such as influencers hired to spread specific narratives or organisations set up by Russian-connected figures, are influencing the political landscape. He noted:
“All this is to tilt the political landscape and cast doubt on any accurate reporting, and tilt the narrative that the military junta’s in the Sahel are popular, successful, and are doing what they promised they would do, and generally trying to paint a picture of Russia as a benevolent patron.”
Mr Duerksen further emphasized that these campaigns are relentless, with constant monitoring of local news environments and information spaces to counter objective reporting about Russia’s influence.
“We can take a step back and think of why Nigeria would be a target of these campaigns. We can read the geopolitical map and think about the fact that Nigeria, despite all of its flaws and democratic setbacks, has been a voice for consolidating ECOWAS to strengthen the rule of law processes in the region.”
He buttressed that it is more like a regional power in terms of enforcing those principles. But with the coup in the Sahel region, there will be an interest to diminish Nigeria’s oversight in the region, and one way of doing that is by driving internal crises and problems in the country so that Nigeria goes back to fixing internal issues and not become a strong voice in the region.
Mr Duerksen also discussed how digital campaigns can translate to offline disinformation and chaos, referencing a recent protest in Nigeria:
“These things are sabotage and violation of Nigeria’s sovereignty, and I do think it will continue, but it all depends on how the Kremlin operation becomes sophisticated and advanced techniques of using disinformation and strategic corruption, recruitment of politicians and local influencers, all intending to weaken Nigeria.”
He concluded by stressing the need for greater awareness of these tactics: “More awareness needs to be raised about these agendas, how they work in the sabotage we are seeing to further strengthen Nigeria’s democracy.”
X has a stern and clear policy against coordinated disinformation: “We do not allow any activity that attempts to manipulate our platform or disrupt our services through inauthentic accounts, behaviour or content,” an apparent offence that these coordinated activities have been perpetuating with no restrictions whatsoever from X.
In his final words, Mr Jonathan says it’s not just about disinformation but also about sovereignty, unity, and the future of a nation deeply connected to Africa’s political and economic landscape. “Nigeria’s strength should now lie in raising awareness, creating counter-narratives, and maintaining collective vigilance against all malicious schemes.”
